Philosophy and Moral Sciences

Central in this thesis is the project of ‘historical cognitive science,’ as described and pursued by John Sutton. Throughout his work, Sutton has provided both exemplars of this project and made remarks about its aims and the rationale behind it.
In this thesis I want to provide my own contribution to this project. I will do this by first discussing the nature and aims of ‘historical cognitive science’ as envisioned by Sutton and afterwards providing two studies which were envisioned as exercises in historical cognitive science.
In the first chapter I will give an outline and discussion of Sutton’s own descriptions of what the project of ‘historical cognitive science’ amounts to. This will provide the background for the two following chapters.
In chapter two I will discuss Robert Hooke’s “universal cure of the mind,” in which books are invoked as an aid to the memory. I will argue that there is a strong structural similarity between the way Hooke conceptualises the role of these aids and Clark & Chalmers theory of the “extended mind”.
Chapter three focuses on the notion of brain plasticity. I will discuss two historical figures in which (brain) plasticity is invoked in a context of self-reformation, namely René Descartes and Denis Diderot. In both cases, the combination of plasticity with the notion of self-reformation or self-discipline will lead to a conceptual separation of the self from the plastic material being reformed.
In the last chapter I will provide a further analysis of the cases discussed in chapter 2 and 3. More specifically, I will look at the implications of the structural similarities between Hooke and Clark & Chalmers. With regards to Descartes, I will use Foucault’s genealogical work to point out the entanglement of psychological practice and theory in the works of Descartes discussed in chapter 3, an entanglement which is also referred to by Sutton.

In this paper, I discuss Pieter van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1761) defence of Newton’s experimental philosophy, in relation to his views on natural laws and their dependence on the power and will of God. At the time van Musschenbroek started his academic career, several universities in the Dutch Republic had been plagued by intellectual and institutional struggles between Aristotelians and Cartesians, sometimes even resulting in physical violence (Ruestow 1973, 34-88). In contrast to these philosophies, van Musschenbroek presents experimental philosophy as a study “free from all disputations and controversies [ab omni disputatione & controversia liber[a]]” (van Musschenbroek 1723, 42). I show how for van Musschenbroek, the harmony in experimental philosophy is premised on the order in nature. Natural phenomena are governed by universal and unchanging laws instituted by God. Therefore, as a diligent study of natural phenomena, experimental philosophy cannot but produce agreement (van Musschenbroek 1723, 43-4). Divine law guarantees order in science. I then discuss the role of van Musschenbroek’s theological views in his defence of the method of experimental philosophy. The order in the world is based on a free and arbitrary act of will by God, whose will and power are beyond our comprehension (van Musschenbroek 1723, 9). The sovereign and free will of God is used to ban a priori reasoning from philosophy and guarantee the sovereignty of the method of experimental philosophy. I conclude by situating van Musschenbroek’s insistence on the stabilising nature of Newtonian experimental philosophy, and his invocation of natural law and God’s sovereignty in the broader religious and political landscape of the Dutch Republic.

Bibliography
Ruestow, Edward G. 1973. Physics at Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Leiden: Philosophy and the New Science in the University. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
van Musschenbroek, Petrus. 1723. Oratio de Certa Methodo Philosophiae Experimentalis. Utrecht: Guilielmum Vande Water.

In this paper, I discuss Petrus van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1761) defence of Newton’s experimental philosophy, in relation to his views on natural laws and their dependence on the power and will of God. At the time van Musschenbroek started his academic career, several universities in the Dutch Republic had been plagued by intellectual and institutional struggles between Aristotelians and Cartesians. In contrast to these philosophies, van Musschenbroek presents experimental philosophy as an enterprise characterised by harmony and consent. This harmony in experimental philosophy is premised on the order in nature. Natural phenomena are governed by universal and unchanging laws instituted by God. Therefore, as a diligent study of natural phenomena, experimental philosophy cannot but produce agreement. Divine law guarantees order in science.  The order in the world is based on a free and arbitrary act of will by God, whose will and power are beyond our comprehension. The sovereign and free will of God is used by Van Musschenbroek to ban a priori reasoning (and therefore Cartesianism) from philosophy and guarantee the sovereignty of the method of experimental philosophy. I will situate van Musschenbroek’s insistence on the stabilising nature of Newtonian experimental philosophy, and his invocation of natural law and God’s sovereignty in the broader religious and political landscape of the Dutch Republic. More specifically, I will focus on the place and function of the university within the Dutch society. Van Musschenbroek’s  (and other Dutch  Newtonians’) use of the concept will be shown to be part of a strategy to institutionally implement the new experimental philosophy by exploiting the nature and specific embededness of the university.

The Dutch Republic played an important role in the dissemination of Newton’s philosophy. There, it found its earliest proponents, who were instrumental in the spread of the Newton’s ideas on the continent. One of these figures was Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761), who during his life took up professorships at the universities of Utrecht and Leiden. In a letter to Newton written at the beginning of his academic career, Musschenbroek explicitly stated that it was his aim to spread the ‘Newtonian philosophy’ in the university, and from there to the rest of Dutch society. In this paper, I focus on Musschenbroek’s activities in the context of the university. First, I analyse Musschenbroek’s defence of the ‘Newtonian philosophy’ in several of his academic orations. I show how Musschenbroek implicitly uses a certain view on the institution of the university and its tasks as a leverage in his defence of the ‘Newtonian philosophy’. Secondly, I analyse the content and organisation of Musschenbroek’s textbooks in the light of the common practices of education at the university. Here, I show how on the one hand Musschenbroek adapted the content and organisation of his material to comply to certain pedagogical traditions, but on the other hand also made pedagogical innovations necessitated by the nature of the ‘new philosophy’. Taken together, this paper hopes to show the challenges that Musschenbroek was confronted with in his attempt to implement the ‘Newtonian philosophy’ in the university, and the way he overcame (some of) them.

The Dutch Republic played an important role in the dissemination of Newton’s philosophy. There, it found its earliest proponents, who were instrumental in the spread of his ideas on the continent. One of these figures was Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761), who took up professorships at the universities of Duisburg, Utrecht, and Leiden. In a letter to Newton written at the beginning of his career, Musschenbroek explicitly stated that it was his aim to spread the ‘Newtonian philosophy’ in the university, and from there to the rest of Dutch society. As part of his attempt to spread this new philosophy, Musschenbroek wrote several textbooks. These were reprinted in other European countries and translated, making them one of the chief vehicles through which Newton’s ideas spread throughout the continent. In this paper, I focus on these textbooks and analyse them in relation to Musschenbroek’s aim of introducing Newton’s ideas in the context of the university and to a broader audience in the Dutch Republic. More specifically, I on the one hand look at the several editions of his Latin textbook which were, as their titles suggest, explicitly written for use in the university (in usus academicos). On the other hand, I look at the two Dutch versions of the textbook written by Musschenbroek “in the service of [his] countrymen” (ten dienste der landgenooten). With regard to the university textbooks, a comparison is made with the textbooks used by Musschenbroek’s predecessors, in order to spell out how the new ‘experimental physics’ differed from the physics taught by Aristotelian or Cartesian professors. Special attention is given to the presentation and organisation of the material in the textbooks. In his orations, Musschenbroek severely criticised philosophers’ excessive inclination towards system-building, arguing instead that one should focus on gathering empirical evidence and performing experiments. In a pedagogical context however, systematicity was an important ideal, and the ordering and systematisation of one’s subject matter was seen as an important task of a professor. By looking at the organisation of the textbooks, I show how Musschenbroek tried to balance the ideal of systematicity in education with his criticism of system-building in philosophy. With regard to the Dutch textbooks, I compare their contents with the textbooks written for use in the university. Musschenbroek explicitly states that the former are more elaborate and thorough than the latter, as they are written for amateurs rather than young students. In the preface to the Dutch textbooks, Musschenbroek refers to societies of scientific amateurs and the courses given to interested burghers by John Theophilus Desaguliers (1683-1744) during his tour in the Dutch Republic. I analyse the content of Mussschenbroek’s Dutch textbook in relation to this audience of amateurs and the practices of education in experimental philosophy they had instituted outside the context of the university. 
Taken together, this provides a general picture of the role and function of the textbooks written by Musschenbroek in his attempts to educate both young university students and the broader public in the ‘Newtonian philosophy’.

As “Curator of Experiments” for the early Royal Society, Robert Hooke (1635-1703), embodied the Baconian ideal of natural science. He tirelessly collected observations, devised and performed experiments, and invented or improved scientific instruments. Along with his practical engagements, Hooke also developed his own theories on phenomena ranging from the nature of light to the origin of fossils. Scattered throughout his writings, we also find methodological reflections. Though broadly Baconian, Hooke also added his own insights, leading to a specific take on the proper method for conducting science. In this essay, I discuss Hooke’s views on the brain in relation to his views on the proper method of observing nature, and his views on the organisation of matter as found in his landmark Micrographia. I will show how Hooke conceptualises the brain as a kind of mirror of nature. This will allow him to develop an optimistic empiricist view on the generation of ideas and our knowledge of nature.

In this presentation, I will give an analysis of Petrus van Musschenbroek's (1692-1761) views on the nature and role of experiments. I will give special attention to the relation between his views on experiments and his views on laws of nature and causes. At several places in his oeuvre, van Musschenbroek explicitly states that the search for causes is part of the practice of experimental philosophy. At other occasions however, he argues that rather than looking for causes, experimental philosophers should be looking for laws. The latter are conceived by him as regularities which can only be discovered by empirical means. In some passages, van Mussschenbroek even states that knowledge of causal relations lies forever outside our reach. In this presentation, I will discuss van Musschenbroek's views on the relation between causes and laws in the practice of experimental philosophy. That is, rather than going into the metaphysics of the relation between causes and laws, I will discuss his views on the search for causes and/or laws in physics through experimentation. This will in turn provide us with a better understanding of the apparent tension between his inclusion of the search for causes in the practice of experimental philosophy on the one hand, and his causal agnosticism on the other.

Teaching is an important aspect of scientific practice. However, it has only recently become the subject of detailed historical and philosophical analyses.
In this paper, I argue that Joseph Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practice has important implications for the study of scientific education. Rouse’s dynamic conception of scientific knowledge entails that education should occupy a central place in our analyses of scientific practices, as it is crucial in guaranteeing their temporal extension and sustenance. However, Rouse’s reconceptualization of scientific knowledge also has implications for our understanding of scientific education itself. I will work out these implications, focussing on Rouse’s non-subject-centered account of scientific practices. More generally, I show how Rouse’s philosophy of science entails that the study of scientific education should take the form of an integrated history and philosophy of scientific education.

Following the example of Newton, the Dutch natural philosopher and professor Petrus van Musschenbroek emphasised the indispensable role of mathematics in the practice of physics. At the same time, van Musschenbroek also warned that one should be conscious of the difference between physical demonstrations and the “pure demonstrations” provided in mathematics. Mathematics works by reasoning on “pure ideas”, disregarding the question whether or not these ideas correspond to physical reality. Therefore, mathematics can only be fruitfully applied in physics through the mediating role of experiments. In this presentation, I will analyse the role of diagrams and images in van Musschenbroek’s textbooks in unifying mathematics with physics. On the one hand, I will explicate van Musschenbroek’s own views on the relationship between mathematics and physics and how they were informed by his empiricist epistemology. I will then show what role, according to him, experiments could and should play in physical demonstrations. After that, I will analyse the functions diagrams can have in this view. On the other hand, I will analyse the way diagrams and illustrations were put to work by van Musschenbroek in the teaching of physico-mathematics. I will show how these visual elements played a unifying role, helping the student to link together geometry, natural philosophy, and his observations of demonstration experiments performed by van Musschenbroek in his courses.

In this article, I discuss a manuscript written by the Dutch natural philosopher and professor Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761), entitled ‘Advice on how the study of philosophy should be directed, read in the year 1730’ (‘Consilia de dirigendo Studio Philosophico. praelecta A° 1730’). I show how the text should be situated in the genre of rationes studii. I analyse the organisation of the manuscript, with special attention for the outline and order of the disciplines discussed by van Musschenbroek. I argue that Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is an important influence here. Next, I present van Musschenbroek’s views on the propaedeutic role of the liberal arts and mathematics. Finally, I discuss van Musschenbroek’s choice of authors (specifically in the sections dealing with physics) in relation to contemporary views on ‘sects’ in philosophy and eclecticism. This will allow me to provide a more nuanced view on van Musschenbroek’s ‘Newtonianism’.

Together with Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688-1742), Pieter (Petrus) van Musschenbroek (1692-1761) was one of the first professors on the Continent to introduce a systematic teaching of the natural philosophical novelties found in Newton’s work into the university. Historians have therefore mostly been interested in van Musschenbroek in the context of the history of “Newtonianism”. The first aim of this dissertation is to move van Musschenbroek ‘out of Newton’s shadow’, to borrow the apt phrase Jip van Besouw has used to characterise his dissertation on ʼs Gravesande. In chapter 1, I provide an overview of the treatment of van Musschenbroek’s “Newtonianism” in the secondary literature. That chapter focusses on the term “Newtonianism” as an actor’s category. More specifically, I discuss and contextualise van Musschenbroek’s self-presentation as a “Newtonian” in his textbooks and orations. I also show that later in his career, van Musschenbroek began to deny belonging to any philosophical “sect”. In other words, he no longer identified himself as a “Newtonian”.
The second aim of this dissertation is thus to gain more insight into these views and into van Musschenbroek’s research practice. In chapter 1, I show how van Musschenbroek consistently emphasised the experimental nature of his philosophy. His stance towards the central and foundational role of experiments in natural philosophy remained a constant throughout his intellectual career. In the rest of the dissertation, I therefore focus on the status of experiments in van Musschenbroek’s methodological thinking and their role in his research. The central question is: what can we learn from experiments? In chapter 2, I discuss van Musschenbroek’s methodological views, with a special focus on his views on the role and function of experiments. The chapter thus looks at the way van Musschenbroek himself would answer the question ‘What can we learn from experiments and how should they be performed adequately?’. Chapter 3 focuses on van Musschenbroek’s experimental research in the fields of the strength of materials and electricity. This chapter goes from theory to practice: what and how did van Musschenbroek learn from experiments in his own research practice? 
In chapter 4, I consider the central question from a philosophical perspective. This relates to the third aim of this dissertation, namely to show what a study of van Musschenbroek’s experimental practice can add to our philosophical understanding of the role of experiments. In chapter 4, I thus explain the choice for using the expression ‘learning in the world’ instead of ‘learning about the world’ in the title of this dissertation. I argue that experimental practice should be seen as an active and situated process of learning in the world. I present an alternative for a theory-centred take on the role of experiments in scientific practice and argue that it provides us with a more adequate view on van Musschenbroek’s activities as an experimentalist.

This draft contains material pertaining to a manuscript written by the university professor Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761) in which he gives his students advice on what and how to study. The manuscript can be found in the special collections section of the Leiden University Library (Bibliotheca Publica Latina, 240.30). In this draft, I discuss van Musschenbroek’s comments on the study of mathematics, mathematical disciplines, and physics. For an elaborate discussion of the manuscript and an overview of its contents, see Present, Pieter. ‘All There Is to Know: Petrus van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1761) Advice to His Students’. Lias 46, no. 1 (2019): 59–92, DOI: 10.2143/LIAS.46.1.3286811.

This is my transcription of a manuscript by Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761). The manuscript is held by the special collections department at the Leiden University Library (Bibliotheca Publica Latina, codex 240, 45). I am sharing this transcription as it might benefit other researchers. Note that this is a draft. As such, it might contain errors. Those who find such errors are invited to communicate them to me (pieter.present@vub.be). I will correct the transcription with due acknowledgments.